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Probabilistic flows of inhabitants in urban areas
and self-organization in housing markets
Takao Hishikawa and Jun-ichi Inoue
Abstract We propose a simple probabilistic model to explain the spatial structure
of the rent distribution of housing market in city of Sapporo. Here we modify the
mathematical model proposed by Gauvin et. al. [1]. Especially, we consider the
competition between two distances, namely, the distance between house and center,
and the distance between house and office. Computer simulations are carried out to
reveal the self-organized spatial structure appearing in the rent distribution. We also
compare the resulting distribution with empirical rent distribution in Sapporo as an
example of cities designated by ordinance. We find that the lowest ranking agents
(from the viewpoint of the lowest ‘willing to pay’) are swept away from relatively
attractive regions and make several their own ‘communities’ at low offering price
locations in the city.
1 Introduction
Collective behaviour of interacting animals such as flying birds, moving insects or
swimming fishes has attracted a lot of attentions by scientists and engineers due
to its highly non-trivial properties. Several remarkable attempts have even done to
figure out the mechanism of the collective phenomena by collecting empirical data
of flocking of starlings with extensive data analysis [2], by computer simulations
of realistic flocking based on a simple algorithm called BOIDS [3, 4]. Applications
of such collective behavior of animals also have been proposed in the context of
engineering [5].
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Apparently, one of the key factors to emerge such non-trivial collective phenom-
ena is ‘local interactions’ between agents. The local interaction in the microscopic
level causes non-trivial structures appearing in the macroscopic system. In other
words, there is no outstanding leader who designs the whole system, however, the
spatio-temporal patterns exhibited by the system are ‘self-organized’ by local deci-
sion making of each interacting ingredient in the system.
These sorts of self-organization by means of local interactions between agents
might appear not only in natural phenomena but also in some social systems in-
cluding economics. For instance, decision making of inhabitants in urban areas in
order to look for their houses, the resulting organization of residential street (area)
and behavior of housing markets are nice examples for such collective behavior and
emergent phenomena. People would search suitable location in their city and decide
to live a rental (place) if the transaction is approved after negotiation in their own
way on the rent with buyers. As the result, the spatio-temporal patterns might be
emerged, namely, both expensive and cheap residential areas might be co-existed
separately in the city. Namely, local decision makings by ingredients — inhabitants
— determine the whole structure of the macroscopic properties of the city, that is to
say, the density of residents, the spatial distribution of rent, and behavior of housing
markets.
Therefore, it is very important for us definitely to investigate which class of in-
habitants chooses which kind of locations, rentals, and what is the main factor for
them to decide their housings. The knowledge obtained by answering the above
naive questions might be useful when we consider the effective urban planning.
Moreover, such a simple but essential question is also important and might be an
advanced issue in the context of the so-called spatial economics [6].
In fact, constructing new landmarks or shopping districts might encourage inhab-
itants to move to a new place to live, and at the same time, the resulting distribution
of residents induced by the probabilistic flow of inhabitants who are looking for a
new place to live might be important information for the administrator to consider
future urban planning. Hence, it could be regarded as a typical example of ‘com-
plex systems’ in which macroscopic information (urban planning) and microscopic
information (flows of inhabitants to look for a new place to live) are co-evolved in
relatively long time scale under weak interactions.
To investigate the macroscopic properties of the system from the microscopic
viewpoint, we should investigate the strategy of decision making for individual per-
son. However, it is still extremely difficult for us to tackle the problem by making
use of scientifically reliable investigation. This is because there exists quite large
person-to-person fluctuation in the observation of individual behaviour. Namely, one
cannot overcome the individual variation to find the universal fact in the behaviour
even though several attempts based on impression evaluation or questionnaire sur-
vey have been done extensively. On the other hand, in our human ‘collective’ be-
haviour instead of individual, we sometimes observe several universal facts which
seem to be suitable materials for computer scientists to figure out the phenomena
through sophisticated approaches such as agent-based simulations or multivariate
statistics accompanying with machine learning technique.
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In a mathematical housing market modeling recently proposed by Gauvin et.
al. [1], they utilized several assumptions to describe the decision making of each
inhabitant in Paris. Namely, they assumed that the intrinsic attractiveness of a city
depends on the place and there exists a single peak at the center. They also used the
assumption that each inhabitant tends to choose the place where the other inhabitants
having the similar or superior income to himself/herself are living. In order to find
the best possible place to live, each buyer in the system moves from one place to the
other according to the transition (aggregation) probability described by the above
two assumption and makes a deal with the seller who presents the best condition
for the buyer. They concluded that the resulting self-organized rent distribution is
almost consistent with the corresponding empirical evidence in Paris. However, it is
hard for us to apply their model directly to the other cities having plural centers (not
only a single center as in Paris).
Hence, here we shall modify the Gauvin’s model [1] to include the much more
detail structure of the attractiveness by taking into account the empirical data con-
cerning the housing situation in the city of Sapporo. Sapporo is the fourth-largest
Fig. 1 Sapporo is the largest city on the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. Sapporo is also
recognized as one of big cities designated by ordinance and it has ten wards (we call ‘ku’ for
‘ward’ in Japanese), namely, Chuo (Central), Higashi (East), Nishi (West), Minami, Kita (North),
Toyohira, Shiraishi, Atsubetsu, Teine and Kiyota.
city in Japan by population, and the largest city on the northern Japanese island of
Hokkaido. Sapporo is also recognized as one of big cities designated by ordinance
and it has ten wards (we call ‘ku’ for ‘ward’ in Japanese), namely, Chuo (Central),
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Higashi (East), Nishi (West), Minami, Kita (North), Toyohira, Shiraishi, Atsubetsu,
Teine and Kiyota as shown in Fig. 1.
We also consider the competition between two distances, namely, the distance
between house and center, and the distance between house and office. Computer
simulations are carried out to reveal the self-organized structure appearing in the
rent distribution. Finally, we compare the resulting distribution with empirical rent
distribution in Sapporo as an example of cities designated by ordinance. We find
that the lowest ranking agents (from the viewpoint of the lowest ‘willing to pay’)
are swept away from relatively attractive regions and make several their own ‘com-
munities’ at low offering price locations in the city.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section 2, we introduce the Gau-
vin’s model [1] and attempt to apply it to explain the housing market in city of Sap-
poro, which is one of typical cites designated by ordinance in Japan. In section 3, we
show the empirical distribution of averaged rent in city of Sapporo and compare the
distribution with that obtained by computer simulations in the previous section 2. In
section 4, we will extend the Gauvin’s model [1] in which only a single center exists
to much more generalized model having multiple centers located on the places of
ward offices. In section 5, we definitely find that our generalized model can explain
the qualitative behavior of spatial distribution of rent in city of Sapporo. In the same
section, we also show several results concerning the office locations of inhabitants
and its effect on the decision making of inhabitant moving to a new place. The last
section 6 is devoted to summary and discussion.
2 The model system
Here we introduce our model system which was originally proposed by Gauvin et.
al. [1]. We also mention the difficulties we encounter when one applies it to the case
of Sapporo city.
2.1 A city — working space —
We define our city as a set of nodes on the L×L square lattice. The side of each
unit of the lattice is 1 and let us call the set as Ω . From the definition, the number
of elements in the set is given by |Ω | ≡ L2. The center of the city is located at
O ≡ (L/2,L/2). The distance between the center O and the arbitrary place in the
city, say, X ≡ (x,y) is measured by
D(X ) =
√
(x−L/2)2 +(y−L/2)2 (1)
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where we should keep in mind that D(X ) ≤ L/2 should be satisfied. Therefore, if
totally N rentals are on sale in the city, N ≡N /L2 houses are put up for sale ‘on
average’ at an arbitrary place X .
2.1.1 Why do we choose city of Sapporo?
As we will see later, our modeling is applicable to any type of city. However, here
we choose our home town, city of Sapporo, as a target city to be examined.
Fig. 2 The mark showing where here is in city of Sapporo (urban district). We can easily find it on
the top of traffic signal as ‘South 5 West 4’, which means that here is south by 5 blocks, west by 4
blocks from the origin (‘Odori Park’, center).
For the above setting of working space, city of Sapporo is a notable town. This
is because the roadways in the urban district are laid to make grid plan road [9].
Hence, we can easily specify each location by the two-dimensional vector, say, ‘S5-
W4’ which means that south by 5 blocks, west by 4 blocks from the origin (‘Odori
Park’, center). Those labels are usually indicated by marks on the top of the traffic
signals (see Fig. 2). These kinds of properties might help us to collect the empirical
data sets and compare them with the outputs from our probabilistic model.
2.2 Agents
We suppose that there co-exist three distinct agents, namely, ‘buyers’, ‘sellers’ and
‘housed’. The total number of these agents is not constant but changing in time.
For instance, in each (unit) time step t = 1, Γ (≥ 1) agents visit to the city as ‘new
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buyers’, whereas α percentage of the total housed persons let the house go for some
amount of money and they become ‘new sellers’. When the ‘new sellers’ succeeded
in selling their houses, they leave the city to move to the other cities. The situation
is illustrated by a cartoon in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3 Three kinds of agents in our model system and those typical behaviors. A newcomer as a
‘buyer’ looks for the housing in the city (say, Sapporo). The ‘housed’ who is living his/her own
house becomes a ‘seller’ when he/she would move to the other city (e.g., Tokyo or Osaka). Each
seller presents the possible rent to the buyers. Once the seller accepts the offer price and makes
a contract with the buyer, the buyer becomes a ‘housed’ at the place and the seller immediately
leaves from the city (Sapporo).
2.2.1 Ranking of agents
Each of agent is categorized (ranked) according to their degree of ‘willing to pay’
for the housing. Let us define the total number of categories by K. Then, the agent
belonging to the category k ∈ {0, · · · ,K− 1} can pay Pk (measured by a currency
unit, for instance Japanese yen) for the housing. Hence, we can give the explicit
ranking to all agents when we put the price Pk in the following order
P0 < P1 < · · ·< PK−1. (2)
In this paper, the price Pk of ‘willing to pay’ is given by
Pk = P0 + k
∆
K− 1 , k = 0, · · · ,K− 1, (3)
namely, as the difference between the highest rent P0 and the lowest PK−1 leads to a
gap ∆ , each category (person) is put into one of the ∆/K intervals. In our computer
simulations which would be given later on, the ranking of each agent is allocated
randomly from {0, · · · ,K− 1}.
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2.3 Attractiveness of locations
A lot of persons are attracted by specific areas close to the railway (subway) stations
or big shopping districts for housing. As well-known, especially in city of Sapporo,
Maruyama-area which is located in the west side of the Sapporo railway station
has been appealed to, in particular, high-ranked persons as an exclusive residential
district. Therefore, one can naturally assume that each area in the city possesses
its own attractiveness and we might regard the attractiveness as time-independent
quantity.
However, the attractiveness might be also dependent on the categories (ranking)
of agents in some sense. For instance, the exclusive residential district is not attrac-
tive for some persons who have relatively lower income and cannot afford the house.
On the other hand, some persons who have relatively higher income do not want to
live the area where is close to the busy street or the slum areas.
Taking into account these two distinct facts, the resulting attractiveness for the
area X should consists of the part of the intrinsic attractiveness A0(X ) which is inde-
pendent of the categories k = 0, · · · ,K− 1 and the another part of the attractiveness
which depends on the categories. Hence, we assume that attractiveness at time t for
the person who belongs to the category k at the area X , that is, Ak(X , t) is updated
by the following spatio-temporal recursion relation:
Ak(X , t + 1) = Ak(X , t)+ω(A0(X )−Ak(X , t))+Φk(X , t) (4)
where A0(X ) stands for the time-independent intrinsic attractiveness for which any
person belonging to any category feels the same amount of charm.
For example, if the center of the city O = (L/2,L/2) possesses the highest intrin-
sic attractiveness A0max as in Paris [1], we might choose the attractiveness A0(X ) as a
two-dimensional Gaussian distribution with mean O = (L/2,L/2) and the variance
R2 as
A0(X ) =
A0max√
2piR2
exp
[
−{(x−L/2)
2+(y−L/2)2}
2R2
]
(5)
where the variance R2 denotes a parameter which controls the range of influence
from the center. We should notice that the equation (4) has a unique solution A0(X )
as a steady state when we set Φk(X , t) = 0.
Incidentally, it is very hard for us to imagine that there exist direct interactions
(that is, ‘communications’) between agents who are looking for their own houses.
However, nobody doubts that children’s education (schools) or public peace should
be an important issue for persons (parents) to look for their housing. In fact, some
persons think that their children should be brought up in a favorable environment
with their son’s/daughter’s friends of the same living standard as themselves. On the
other hand, it might be rare for persons to move to the area where a lot of people
who are lower living standard than themselves. Namely, it is naturally assumed that
people seek for the area as their housing place where the other people who are higher
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living standard than themselves are living, and if possible, they would like to move
such area.
Hence, here we introduce such ‘collective effects’ into the model system by
choosing the term Φk(X , t) as
Φk(X , t) = ε ∑
k′≥k
vk′ (X , t) (6)
where vk(X , t) stands for the density of housed persons who are in the category k
at the area X at time t. Namely, from equations (4) and (6), the attractiveness of
the area X for the people of ranking k, that is, Ak(X , t) increases at the next time
step t +1 when persons who are in the same as or higher ranking than k start to live
at X . It should bear in mind that the intrinsic part of attractiveness A0(X ) is time-
independent, whereas Φk(X , t) is time-dependent through the flows of inhabitants
in the city. Thus, the Ak(X , t) could have a different shape from the intrinsic part
A0(X ) due to the effect of the collective behavior of inhabitants Φk(X , t).
2.4 Probabilistic search of locations by buyers
The buyers who have not yet determined their own house should look for the loca-
tion. Here we assume that they move to an arbitrary area ‘stochastically’ according
to the following probability:
pik(X , t) =
1− exp(−λ Ak(X , t))
∑X ′∈Ω{1− exp(−λ Ak(X
′
, t))} (7)
Namely, the buyers move to the location X to look for their housing according to the
above probability. The situation is shown as a cartoon in Fig. 4. We easily find from
Fig. 4 In each time step, a buyer visits a place X with a probability (7). By repeating the transition
processes, a buyer explores the suitable and desirable location in the city from place to place.
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equation (7) that for arbitrary λ , the area which exhibits relatively high attractive-
ness is more likely to be selected as a candidate to visit at the next round. Especially,
in the limit of λ → ∞, the buyers who are looking for the locations visit only the
highest attractiveness location
X k = argmaxX Ak(X , t). (8)
On the other hand, for λ ≪ 1, equation (7) leads to
pik(X , t) =
Ak(X , t)
∑X ′∈Ω Ak(X
′
, t)
, (9)
and the probability for buyers to visit the place X at time t is proportional to the
attractiveness corresponding to the same area Ak(X , t).
Here we should mention that when we regard the ‘location’ as ‘company’, the
present model system is described by similar aggregation probability to the proba-
bilistic labor market proposed by Chen et. al. [7] where the parameter γ corresponds
to the λ in the Gauvin’s model [1].
2.5 Offering prices by sellers
It is not always possible for buyers to live at the location X where they have selected
to visit according to the probability pik(X , t) because it is not clear whether they can
accept the price offered by the sellers at X or not. Obviously, the offering price itself
depends on the ranking k of the sellers. Hence, here we assume that the sellers of
ranking k at the location X offer the buyers the price:
Pok (X ) = P
0 +[1− exp(−ξ A(X , t))]Pk (10)
for the rental housing, where A(X , t) means the average of the attractiveness Ak(X , t)
over the all categories k = 0, · · · ,K− 1, that is to say,
A(X , t)≡ 1
K
K−1
∑
k=0
Ak(X , t), (11)
and ξ is a control parameter. In the limit of ξ → ∞, the offering price by a seller of
ranking k is given by the sum of the basic rent P0 and the price of ‘willing to pay’
for the sellers of ranking k, namely, Pk as Pok = P0 +Pk.
For the location X in which any transaction has not yet been approved, the offer-
ing price is given as
Pok (X ) = P
0 +[1− exp(−ξ A(X , t))]P1 (12)
because the ranking of the sellers is ambiguous for such location X .
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2.6 The condition on which the transaction is approved
It is needed for buyers to accept the price offered by sellers in order to approve
the transaction. However, if the offering price is higher than the price of ‘willing
to pay’ for the buyer, the buyer cannot accept the offer. Taking into account this
limitation, we assume that the following condition between the buyer of the ranking
k and the seller of the ranking k′ at the location X should be satisfied to approve the
transaction.
Pk > Pok′ (X ) (13)
Thus, if and only if the above condition (13) is satisfied, the buyer can own the
housing (the seller can sell the housing).
We should keep in mind that there is a possibility for the lowest ranking people
to fail to own any housing in the city even if they negotiate with the person who
also belongs to the lowest ranking. To consider the case more carefully, let us set
k = k′ = 0 in the condition (13), and then we have P0 > P0/exp[−ξ A(X , t)]. Hence,
for the price of ‘willing to pay’ P0 of the lowest ranking people, we should determine
the lowest rent P0 so as to satisfy P0 < exp[−ξ A( ˜X , t)]P0. Then, the lowest ranking
people never fail to live in the city.
We next define the actual transaction price as interior division point between Pk
and Po
k′
(X ) by using a single parameter β as
Ptr = (1−β )Pk′ (X )+β Pk. (14)
By repeating these three steps, namely, probabilistic searching of the location by
buyers, offering the rent by sellers, transaction between buyers and sellers for
enough times, we evaluate the average rent at each location X and draw the den-
sity of inhabitants, the spatial distribution of the average rent in two-dimension. In
following, we show our preliminary results.
2.7 Computer simulations: A preliminary
In Fig. 5, we show the spatial density distribution ρ(r) of inhabitants by the
Gauvin’s model [1] having a single center in the city. The horizontal axis r of
these panels stands for the distance between the center O and the location X ,
namely, r = D(X ). We set the parameters appearing in the model as L = 100,α =
0.1,K = 10,P0 = 15,000,∆ +P0 = 120,000(∆ = 105,000),ω = 1/15,R = 10,ε =
0.0022,λ = 0.01,ζ = 0.1,P0 = 9,000,P1 = 200,000,β = 0.1,Γ = L2/K,
T = 100(≡ Total number of updates (4)). It should be noted that the definition of
density is given by
ρ(r)≡ (# of inhabitants of ranking k at the location r)(Total # of inhabitants at the location r) . (15)
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From the lower panel, we easily recognize that the persons who are belonging to
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Fig. 5 The spatial density ρ(r) of inhabitants obtained by the Gauvin’s model [1] having a single
center in the city. The horizontal axis r stands for the distance between the center O = (L/2,L/2)
and the location X = (x,y), namely, r = D(X ). The upper panel is the result for the highest raining
people (k = K− 1), whereas the lower panel shows the result for the lowest ranking inhabitants
(k = 0). We easily recognize that the persons who are belonging to the lowest ranking cannot live
the area close to the center.
the lowest ranking cannot live the area close to the center in the city. Thus, we find
that there exists a clear division of inhabitants of different rankings.
Intuitively, these phenomena might be understood as follows. The persons of the
highest ranking (k = K− 1) can afford to accept any offering price at any location.
At the same time, the effect of aggregation induced by ΦK−1(X , t) in the search-
ing probability piK−1(X , t) and the update rule of AK−1(X , t) in (4) is the weakest
among the K categories. As the result, the steady state of the update rule (4) is not
so deviated from the intrinsic attractiveness, namely, AK−1(X , t) ≃ A0(X ). Hence,
people of the highest ranking are more likely to visit the locations where are close
to the center X =O and they live there. Of course, the density of the highest ranking
persons decreases as r increases.
On the other hand, people of the lowest ranking (k = 0) frequently visit the lo-
cations where various ranking people are living due to the aggregation effect of the
term Φ0(X , t) to look for their housing. However, it is strongly dependent on the
offering price at the location whether the persons can live there or not. Namely, the
successful rate of transaction depends on which ranking buyer offers the price at the
place X . For the case in which the ‘housed’ people changed to sellers at the location
where is close to the center, the seller is more likely to be the highest ranking per-
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son because he/she was originally an inhabitant owing the house near the center. As
the result, the price offered by them might be too high for the people of the lowest
ranking to pay for approving the transaction. Therefore, the lowest raining people
might be driven away to the location where is far from the center.
3 Empirical data in city of Sapporo
Apparently, the above simple modeling with a single center of city is limited to the
specific class of city like Paris. Turning now to the situation in Japan, there are sev-
eral major cites designated by ordinance, and city of Sapporo is one of such ‘mega
cities’. In Table 1, we show several statistics in Sapporo in 2010. From this table,
we recognize that in each year, 63,021 persons are moving into and 57,587 persons
are moving out from Sapporo. Hence, the population in Sapporo is still increasing
by approximately six thousand in each year. As we already mentioned, Sapporo is
Wards # of moving-in # of moving-out lowest (yen) highest (yen)
Chuo (Central) 12,132 10,336 19,000 120,000
Kita (North) 8,290 7,970 15,000 73,000
Higashi (East) 7,768 7,218 20,000 78,500
Shiraishi 6,857 6,239 25,000 67,000
Atsubetsu 4,003 3,736 33,000 57,000
Toyohira 7,854 7,037 20,000 69,000
Kiyota 2,560 2,398 30,000 55,000
Minami (South) 3,824 3,794 23,000 58,000
Nishi 6,315 5,788 20,000 80,000
Teine 3,418 3,071 20,000 68,000
Total 63,021 57,587 — —
Table 1 Statistics in city of Sapporo for the number of persons who were moving-into and -out,
the lowest and highest rents (the unit is Japanese yen) of 2DK-type flats in city of Sapporo.
the fourth-largest city in Japan by population, and the largest city on the northern
Japanese island of Hokkaido. Sapporo is recognized as one of big cities designated
by ordinance and it has ten wards (what we call ‘ku’ in Japanese), namely, Chuo,
Higashi, Nishi, Minami, Kita, Toyohira, Shiraishi, Atsubetsu, Teine and Kiyota as
shown in Table 1 (for details, see [9] for example). Hokkaido prefectural office is
located in Chuo-ku and the other important landmarks concentrate in the wards.
Moreover, as it is shown in Table 1, the highest and the lowest rents for the 2DK-
type (namely, a two-room apartment with a kitchen/dining area) flats in Chuo-ku
are both the highest among ten wards. In this sense, Chuo-ku could be regarded as a
‘center’ of Sapporo. However, the geographical structure of rent distribution in city
of Sapporo is far from the symmetric one as given by the intrinsic attractiveness
A0(X ) having a single center (see equation (5)). In fact, we show the rough distribu-
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tion of average rents in city of Sapporo in Fig.6 by making use of the empirical data
collected from [8]. From this figure, we clearly confirm that the spatial structure of
rents in city of Sapporo is not symmetric but apparently asymmetric.
Fig. 6 The spatial distribution of the averaged rent in city of Sapporo by using the empirical hous-
ing data collected from [8]. In Sapporo, ten wards Chuo (Central), Higashi (East), Nishi (West),
Minami (South), Kita, Toyohira, Shiraishi, Atsubetsu, Teine and Kiyota exist. (COLOR ONLINE)
From this distribution, we also find that the average rent is dependent on wards,
and actually it is very hard to simulate the similar spatial distribution by using the
Gauvin’s model [1] in which there exists only a single center in the city. This is
because in a city designated by ordinance like Sapporo, each ward formulates its
own community, and in this sense, each ward should be regarded as a ‘small city’
having a single (or multiple) center(s). It might be one of the essential differences
between Paris and Sapporo.
4 An extension to a city having multiple centers
In the previous section 3, we found that the Gauvin’s model [1] having only a single
center is not suitable to explain the empirical evidence for a city designated by
ordinance such as Sapporo where multiple centers as wards co-exist.
Therefore, in this section, we modify the intrinsic attractiveness A0(X ) to ex-
plain the empirical evidence in city of Sapporo. For this purpose, we use the label
l = 1, · · · ,10 to distinguish ten words in Sapporo, namely, Chuo (Central), Higashi
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(East), Nishi (West), Minami (South), Kita (North), Toyohira, Shiraishi, Atsubetsu,
Teine and Kiyota in this order, and define Bl = (xBl ,yBl ), l = 1, · · · ,10 for each lo-
cation where each ward office is located. Then, we shall modify the intrinsic attrac-
tiveness in terms of the Bl as follows.
A0(X ) =
10
∑
l=1
δl√
2piRl
exp
[
−{(x− xBl)
2 +(y− yBl)2}
2R2l
]
(16)
where
δ1 + · · ·+ δ10 = 1 (17)
should be satisfied. Namely, we would represent the intrinsic attractiveness A0(X ) in
city of Sapporo by means of a two-dimensional mixture of Gaussians in which each
mean corresponds to the location of the ward office. Rl (l = 1, · · · ,10) denotes a set
of parameters which control the spread of the center. In our computer simulations,
we set Rl = 5 for all l = 1, · · · ,10 in our intrinsic attractiveness (16).
Here we encounter a problem, namely, we should choose each weight δl , l =
1, · · · ,10. For this purpose, we see the number of estates (flats) in each wards. From a
real-estate agents in Sapporo [11], we have the statistics as Chuo (Central) (9,598),
Higashi (East) (6,433), Nishi (West) (5,830), Minami (South) (1,634), Kita (North)
(4,671), Toyohira (4,893), Shiraishi (5,335), Atsubetsu (1,104), Teine (2,094), Kiy-
ota (962). Hence, by dividing each number by the maximum 9,598 for Chuo-ku, the
weights δl , l = 1, · · · ,10 are chosen as Chuo (Central) (δ1 ∝ 1.0), Higashi (East)
(δ2 ∝ 0.67), Nishi (West) (δ3 ∝ 0.61), Minami (South) (δ4 ∝ 0.17), Kita (North)
(δ5 ∝ 0.49), Toyohira (δ6 ∝ 0.51), Shiraishi (δ7 ∝ 0.56), Atsubetsu (δ8 ∝ 0.12), Teine
(δ9 ∝ 0.22), Kiyota (δ10 ∝ 0.1). Of course, we normalize these parameters so as to
satisfy the condition (17).
5 Computer simulations
In this section, we show the results of computer simulations.
5.1 Spatial structure in the distribution of visiting times
In Fig. 7 (left), we show the distributions of the number of persons who checked
the information about the flat located at X and the number of persons who visited
the place X according to the transition probability (7) in the right panel. From this
figure, we find that the locations (flats) X where people checked on the web site [11]
most frequently concentrate around each ward office. From this fact, our modeling
in which we choose the locations of multiple centers as the places of wards might
be approved. Actually, from the right panel of this figure, we are confirmed that the
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structure of spatial distribution is qualitatively very similar to the counter-empirical
distribution (right panel).
Fig. 7 The distributions of the number of persons who checked the information about the flat
located at X on the web site (left, from [11]) and the number of persons who visited the place X
according to the transition probability (7) (right) in our artificial society. (COLOR ONLINE)
In order to investigate the explicit ranking dependence of the housing-search be-
havior of agents, in Fig. 8 (the upper panels), we plot the spatial distribution of the
number of visits for the lowest ranking k = 0 (left) and the highest ranking k = 9
(right) agents. We also plot the corresponding spatial distributions of the number
of the transaction approvals in the lower two panels. From this figure, we confirm
that the lowest ranking agents visit almost whole area of the city, whereas the high-
est ranking agents narrow down their visiting place for housing search. This result
is naturally understood as follows. Although the lowest ranking agents visit some
suitable places to live, they cannot afford to accept the offer price given by the sell-
ers who are selling the flats at the place. As the result, such lowest ranking agents
should wander from place to place to look for the place where the offer price is low
enough for them to accept. That is a reason why the spatial distribution of visit for
the lowest ranking agents distributes widely in the city. On the other hand, the high-
est ranking agents posses enough ‘willing to pay’ P9 and they could live any place
they want. Therefore, their transactions are easily approved even at the centers of
wards with relatively high intrinsic attractiveness A0(X ).
As a non-trivial finding, it should be noticed from Fig. 8 that in the northern part
of the city (a part of Kita and Higashi-ku), several small communities consisting of
the lowest ranking persons having their ‘willing to pay’ P0 emerge. In our modeling,
we do not use any ‘built-in’ factor to generate this sort of non-trivial structure. This
result might imply that communities of poor persons could be emerged in any city
in any country even like Japan.
Let us summarize our findings from simulation concerning ranking dependence
of search-approvals by agents below.
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Fig. 8 The upper two panels show the spatial distribution of the number of visits consisting of the
lowest ranking k = 0 (left) and the highest ranking k = 9 (right) agents. The corresponding spatial
distributions of the number of the transaction approvals are shown in the lower panels. (COLOR
ONLINE)
• The lowest ranking agents (k = 0) visit almost all of regions in city even though
such places are highly ‘attractive places’.
• The highest ranking agents (k = 9) visit relatively high attractive places. The
highest ranking agents are rich enough to afford to accept any offering price,
namely, # of contracts ≃ # of visits.
• The lowest ranking agents are swept away from relatively attractive regions and
make several their own ‘communities’ at low offering price locations in the city
(the north-east area in Sapporo).
5.2 The rent distribution
In Fig. 9 (left), we plot the resulting spatial distribution of rent in city of Sapporo.
From this figure we confirm that the spatial distribution is quantitatively similar to
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the empirical evidence. We also find that a complicated structure — a sort of spatial
anisotropy — emerges and it is completely different from the result by the Gauvin’s
model [1]. In particular, we should notice that relatively high rent regions around
Chuo-ku appear. These regions are located near Kita, Higashi, Nishi and Shiraishi.
Fig. 9 The resulting spatial distributions of rent in city of Sapporo. In the left panel, we do not
consider the effect of office locations on buyer’s decision, whereas in the right panel, the effect is
taken into account. (COLOR ONLINE)
To see the gap between our result and empirical evidence quantitatively, we show
the simulated average rent and the counter-empirical evidence in Table 2. From
this table, we find that the order of the top two wards simulated by our model,
namely, Chuo and Shiraishi coincides with the empirical evidence, and moreover,
the simulated rent itself is very close to the market price. However, concerning the
order of the other wards, it is very hard for us to conclude that the model simulates
the empirical data. Of course, the market price differences in those wards are very
small and it is very difficult to simulate the correct ranking at present. Thus, the
modification of our model to generate the correct ranking and to obtain the simulated
rents which are much closer to the market prices should be addressed our future
study.
5.3 On the locations of offices
In the previous sections, we modified the intrinsic attractiveness so as to possess the
multiple peaks at the corresponding locations of the ward offices by (16). However,
inhabitants must go to their office every weekday, and the location of office might
give some impact on the decision making of each buyer in the city. For a lot of
inhabitants in Sapporo city, their offices are located within the city, however, the
locations are distributed. Hence, here we specify the ward in which his/her office is
located by the label m = 1, · · · ,10 and rewrite the intrinsic attractiveness (16) as
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ranking market price (yen)
Chuo (Central) 54,200
Shiraishi 51,100
Nishi (West) 48,200
Kiyota 45,800
Teine 42,900
Kita (North) 41,700
Higashi (East) 40,100
Atsubetsu 39,700
Toyohira 39,600
Minami (South) 34,400
ranking simulated average rent (yen)
Chuo (Central) 50,823
Shiraishi 43,550
Higashi (East) 44,530
Kita (North) 43,516
Nishi (West) 43,093
Toyohira 42,834
Minami (South) 39,909
Teine 39,775
Kiyota 37,041
Atsubetsu 36,711
Table 2 The left list shows the ranking (order) and the market prices. The simulated average rent
for each ward and the ranking are shown in the right list. The unit of price is Japanese yen [11].
A0m(X ) =
10
∑
l 6=m
δl√
2piRl
exp
[
−{(x− xBl)
2 +(y− yBl)2}
2R2l
]
+
(δm +η)√
2piRm
exp
[
−{(x− xBm)
2 +(y− yBm)2}
2R2m
]
.
Namely, for the buyer who has his/her office within the ward m, the ward m might be
a ‘special region’ for him/her and the local peak appearing in the intrinsic attractive-
ness is corrected by η . If he/she seeks for the housing close to his/her house (because
the commuting cost is high if the office is far from his/her house), the correction η
takes a positive value. On the other hand, if the buyer wants to live the place located
far from the office for some reasons (for instance, some people want to vary the pace
of their life), the correction η should be negative. To take into account these naive
assumptions, we might choose η as a snapshot from a Gaussian with mean zero and
the variance σ2(< δm). From this type of corrections, the buyer, in particular, the
buyer of the highest ranking (k = K−1) might feel some ‘frustration’ to make their
decision, which is better location for them between Chuo-ku as the most attractive
ward and the ward m where his/her office is located under the condition δ1 ≃ δm+η .
For the set of weights δm, m = 1, · · · ,10, we take into account the number of of-
fices in each ward, that is, Chuo (23,506), Kita (8,384), Higashi (8,396), Shiraishi
(7,444), Toyohira (6.652), Minami (3,418), Nishi (6,599), Atsubetsu (2,633), Teine
(3,259), Kiyota (2,546). Then, we choose each δm by dividing each number by the
maximum of Chuo-ku as Chuo (δ1 ∝ 1.00), Higashi (δ2 ∝ 0.36), Nishi (δ3 ∝ 0.28),
Minami (δ4 ∝ 0.15), Kita (δ5 ∝ 0.36), Toyohira (δ6 ∝ 0.28), Shiraishi (δ7 ∝ 0.32),
Atsubetsu (δ8 ∝ 0.11), Teine (δ9 ∝ 0.14), Kiyota (δ10 ∝ 0.11). For the bias parameter
η , we pick up the value randomly from the range:
|η |< δm, (18)
instead of the Gaussian.
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The resulting spatial distribution is shown in the right panel of Fig. 9. From this
panel, we are clearly confirmed that the spatial structure of rents distributes more
widely in whole city than that without taking into account the office location (see the
left panel in Fig. 9 for comparison). We should notice that the range of simulated
rent in the city is remarkably reduced from [0,120,000] to [0,60,000] due to the
diversification of values to consider the location of their housing.
5.4 On the effective time-scale of update rule
Until now, we did not make a mention of time scale in the spatio-temporal update
rule (4) in the attractiveness Ak(X , t). However, it might be important to for us con-
sider how long the time in our model system (artificial society) goes on for the
minimum time step t → t + 1, especially when we evaluate the necessary period of
time to complete the accumulation of community after new-landmarks or shopping
mall come out. To decide the effective time-scale for t → t + 1, we use the infor-
mation about the number of persons moving-into city of Sapporo through the year.
Let us define the number from the empirical data by C. Then, we should remember
that in our simulation, we assumed that in each time step (t → t + 1), Γ newcomers
visit the city. Hence, the actual time τ for the minimum time step t → t + 1 in our
artificial society is effectively given by
τ = 365× Γ
C
[days]. (19)
Therefore, by using our original set-up Γ ≡ L2/K = (100× 100)/10 = 1000 and
by making use of the data listed in Table 1, we obtain C = 63021, and substitut-
ing the value into (19), we finally have τ = (1000× 365)/63021= 5.79 [days] for
t → t +1. This means that approximately 579 days have passed when we repeat the
spatio-temporal update rule (4) by T = 100 times. This information might be es-
sential when we predict the future housing market, let us say, after constructing the
Hokkaido Shinkansen (a rapid express in Japan) railway station, related landmarks
and derivative shopping mall.
6 Summary and discussion
In this paper, we modified the Gauvin’s model [1] to include the city having multiple
centers such as the city designated by ordinance by correcting the intrinsic attrac-
tiveness A0(X ). As an example for such cities, we selected our home town Sapporo
and attempted to simulate the spacial distribution of averaged rent. We found that
our model can explain the empirical evidence qualitatively. Especially, we found
that the lowest ranking agents (from the viewpoint of the lowest ‘willing to pay’)
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are swept away from relatively attractive regions and make several their own ‘com-
munities’ at low offering price locations in the city.
However, we should mention that we omitted an important aspect in our mod-
eling. Namely, the spatial resolution of working space and probabilistic search by
buyer taking into account their office location. In following, we will make remarks
on those two issues.
6.1 The ‘quasi-one-dimensional’ model
The problem of spatially low resolution of working space might be overcame when
we model the housing market focusing on Chuo-ku instead of whole (urban) part
of Sapporo. In the modeling, we restrict ourselves to the ‘quasi-one-dimensional’
working space and this approach enables us to compare the result with the corre-
sponding empirical data. Although it is still at the preliminary level, we show the
resulting rent distribution along the Tozai-subway line which is running across the
center of Sapporo (Chuo-ku) from the west to the east as in Fig. 10. Extensive nu-
merical studies accompanying with collecting data with higher resolution are needed
to proceed the present study and it should be addressed as our future work.
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Fig. 10 The resulting rent distribution along the Tozai-subway line obtained by the quasi-one-
dimensional model. The correspondence between x-axis and the location of each subway station is
explicitly given as follows: Bus-center mae (x = 86), ¯Odori (x = 76), Nishi 11-Choume (x = 54),
Nishi 18-Choume (x = 36), Maruyama Kouen (x = 22), and Nishi 28-Choume (x = 11).
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6.2 Probabilistic search depending on the location of office
Some of buyers might search their housing locations by taking into account the
place of their office. Here we consider the attractiveness Bk,i(X , t) of office location
X for i ranking k at time t. Namely, we should remember that the attractiveness for
the place to live is updated as
Ak(X , t + 1) = Ak(X , t)+ω(A0(X )−Ak(X , t))+ ε ∑
k′≥k
v
′
k(X , t) (20)
depending on the intrinsic attractiveness of place to live, whereas the attractiveness
of the place X for agent i of ranking k who takes into account the location of their
office place Y k,i is also defined accordingly and it is governed by
Bk,i(X , t + 1) = Bk,i(X , t)+ω(B0k,i(|X −Y k,i|)−Bk,i(X , t))+ ε ∑
k′≥k
vk′ (X , t) (21)
where B0k,i(|X −Y k,i|) is ‘intrinsic attractiveness’ of the location X for the agent i
whose office is located at Y k,i and it is given explicitly by
B0k,i(|X −Y k,i|) =
1√
2piQexp
[
− (X −Y k,i)
2
2piQ2
]
, (22)
and ω ,ε are parameters to be calibrated using the empirical data sets.
Then, agent i looks for the candidates X A,X B to live according to the following
probabilities
pi
(A)
k (X , t) =
1− exp(−λ Ak(X , t))
∑X ′∈Ω{1− exp(−λ Ak(X
′
, t))} (23)
pi
(B)
k,i (X , t) =
1− exp(−λ Bk,i(X , t))
∑X ′∈Ω{1− exp(−λ Bk,i(X
′
, t))} (24)
If the both X A,X B are approved, transaction price for each place is given by
P(A)tr = (1−β )Pk′ (X A)+β Pk (25)
P(B)tr = (1−β )Pk′ (X B)+β Pk (26)
The finial decision X F is
X F = argmin{P(A)tr +ρmlA, ,P(B)tr +ρmlB}, F = {A,B} (27)
where ρmlA,ρmlB are travel costs between X A,X B and office (see Fig. 11).
Therefore, the agents might prefer relatively closer place to the office to the at-
tractive place to live when the distance between the attractive place to live and the
office is too far for agents to manage the cost by the commuting allowance.
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Fig. 11 Each buyer decides the final location X F = argmin{P(A)tr + ρmlA, ,P(B)tr + ρmlB},F =
{A,B}.
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